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CUTTING CYBERSTALKING’S GORDIAN KNOT: A SIMPLE 
AND UNIFIED STATUTORY APPROACH 
Casey O’Connor* 
I.  INTRODUCTION 
The Internet and other telecommunications technologies 
are promoting advances in virtually every aspect of society 
and every corner of the globe: fostering commerce, 
improving education and health care, promoting 
participatory democracy in the United States and abroad, 
and facilitating communications among family and friends, 
whether across the street or around the world.  
Unfortunately, many of the attributes of this technology—
low cost, ease of use, and anonymous nature, among 
others—make it an attractive medium for fraudulent scams, 
child sexual exploitation, and increasingly, a new concern 
known as “cyberstalking.”1 
 
These words, written more than a decade ago, described the 
emerging difficulty of keeping apace with technology in a rapidly 
changing world.  With the explosion of social media and expansion 
in online capabilities forming new means through which 
cyberstalkers accomplish their malicious ends, these concerns 
resonate no less strongly today.  Although the law has attempted to 
keep up, the current system creates dueling obligations and 
confusions that often obscure justice.  
Consider the case of Jake Baker and Arthur Gonda.2  The two 
men were online acquaintances who exchanged e-mails that 
expressed their mutual “sexual interest in violence against women.”3  
Their often-explicit communications detailed their intention to 
 
* J.D. Candidate, 2013, Seton Hall University School of Law; B.A., summa cum 
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 1  1999 REPORT ON CYBERSTALKING: A NEW CHALLENGE FOR LAW ENFORCEMENT AND 
INDUSTRY: A REPORT FROM THE ATTORNEY GENERAL TO THE VICE PRESIDENT (Aug. 1999), 
available at http://www.cyber-rights.org/documents/cyberstalkingreport.htm. 
 2  United States v. Alkhabaz, 104 F.3d 1492 (6th Cir. 1997).   
 3  Id. at 1493. 
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convert their interest into action.4  For example, “Wiat [sic] until late 
at night.  grab [sic] her when she goes to unlock the door.  Knock 
her unconscious.  and [sic] put her into one of those portable lockers 
(forget the word for it).  or [sic] even a duffle bag.  Then hurry her 
out to the car and take her away . . . What do you think?”5  Baker went 
further, posting a story on an online forum that described “the 
torture, rape, and murder of a young woman who shared the name of 
one of Baker’s classmates at the University of Michigan.”6  When the 
story was discovered, the duo was indicted under 18 U.S.C. § 875(c), 
which prohibits sending a “communication containing any threat” to 
kidnap or injure a person in interstate commerce.7  Despite the vile 
nature of the communications and the apparent applicability of the 
statute, the Sixth Circuit affirmed the trial court’s dismissal of the 
indictment.8  According to the court, for a communication to rise to 
the level of “threat,” it must be “conveyed to effect some change or 
achieve some goal through intimidation.”9  Because Baker and Gonda 
neither sought change nor desired a particular goal, their terrifying 
rhetoric went unpunished.10 
Cyberstalkers also use the Internet to facilitate their in-person 
stalking, often bypassing steps in the “course of conduct” required by 
many traditional stalking statutes,11 as in the case of Amy Lynn 
Boyer.12  She was stalked and later murdered while leaving work by 
Liam Youens, a man she did not know.13  This tragedy is notable 
because Youens did not obtain Boyer’s work address as stalkers 
normally do.14  Instead, he purchased the information, as well as her 
 
 4  Id.  
 5  Id. at 1500 (Krupansky, J., dissenting).  
 6  Id. at 1493 (majority opinion). 
 7  Id.; 18 U.S.C. § 875(c) (2012). 
 8  Alkhabaz, 104 F.3d at 1496. 
 9  Id. 
 10  Id. 
 11  New Hampshire’s stalking statute, for instance, prohibits a person from 
engaging in a “course of conduct targeted at a specific person which would cause a 
reasonable person to fear for his or her personal safety.”  N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 
633:3-a (2013).  The statute enumerates certain behavior included in a “course of 
conduct,” like “[f]ollowing, approaching, or confronting . . . [or] [a]ppearing in 
close proximity to [the person].”  Id.  Notably absent are non-physical methods of 
information gathering.  
 12  Chris Wright, Murder.com: What Happened Last Fall on This Tiny New Hampshire 
Street Triggered a National Debate on Internet Crime. But was the Web Really to Blame for the 
Death of Amy Boyer?, THE BOS. PHOENIX, Aug. 10, 2000, available at 
http://www.bostonphoenix.com/archive/features/00/08/10/MURDER.html. 
 13  Id.  After murdering Boyer, Youens turned his gun on himself.  Id. 
 14  Id. 
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social security number, from an online data broker called 
Docusearch.15  As Youens himself acknowledged, “[i]t’s actually 
obscene what you can find out about a person on the internet.”16 
Even newer technologies have provided individuals different 
means with which to harass.17  Offensive communications on social 
networking websites like Facebook and Twitter present traditional 
First Amendment issues in unique contexts.  In a recent example, 
William Cassidy allegedly posted hundreds of threatening Twitter 
messages, almost all aimed at American Buddhist figure Alyce Zeoli.18  
Cassidy argued that a conviction would impinge upon his First 
Amendment rights, and the District Court of Maryland agreed.19  In 
defense of its position, the court analogized Twitter to colonial-era 
bulletin boards, leaving itself vulnerable to the criticism that its 
understanding of the medium lacks nuance.20  Clearly, the courts are 
still grappling with the proper characterization of these websites and 
the nature of their communications, a difficulty that underscores the 
challenges inherent in creating viable statutory mechanisms for 
punishing cyberstalking. 
“Cyberstalking by proxy”21 further complicates the picture, as the 
recent Craigslist rape case demonstrates.22  Jebidiah James Stipe 
created a false Craigslist posting in his ex-girlfriend’s name in which 
he claimed that she had a rape fantasy.23  Another man, Ty Oliver 
MacDowell, believing the ad to be legitimate, went to her house and 
raped her at gunpoint.24  Stipe was indeed punished, but not under 
any cyberstalking laws.25  Although this type of conduct seems like 
 
 15  Id. 
 16  Id. 
 17  See, e.g., Caroline Black, Ex-Marine Jebidiah James Stipe Gets 60 Years for Craigslist 
Rape Plot, CBS NEWS (June 29, 2010), http://www.cbsnews.com/8301-504083_162-
20009162-504083.html; Somini Sengupta, Case of 8,000 Menacing Posts Tests Limits of 
Twitter Speech, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 26, 2011, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2011 
/08/27/technology/man-accused-of-stalking-via-twitter-claims-free-speech.html; Bob 
Sullivan, Vengeful Online Sex Ads Take Growing Toll, THE REDTAPE CHRONICLES (July 27, 
2010), http://redtape.msnbc.msn.com/_news/2010/07/27/6345571-vengeful 
-online-sex-ads-take-growing-toll.  
 18  Sengupta, supra note 17.   
 19  United States v. Cassidy, 814 F. Supp. 2d 574 (D. Md. 2011); see infra text 
accompanying notes 189–202. 
 20  Cassidy, 814 F. Supp. 2d at 576; see infra text accompanying notes 189–202.  
 21  Sullivan, supra note 17. 
 22  Black, supra note 17. 
 23  Id. 
 24  Id. 
 25  Stipe pleaded guilty to sexual assault, aggravated kidnapping, and aggravated 
burglary, and will serve a sixty-year prison sentence.  Id. 
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exactly the type of harm that cyberstalking statutes should address, 
the current cyberstalking statutory regime is inadequate because both 
state and federal laws require the perpetrator to contact the victim 
directly.26  Some commentators have called for amendments to 
address this shortcoming.27 
The foregoing illustrates the insufficiency of the criminal law as 
presently constituted to address cyberstalking.  While state and 
federal statutes exist, they often fail to criminalize conduct whose 
harms are self-evident, as in the cases above.  When the statutes do 
cover such conduct, they do so in divergent ways.  The resultant web 
of statutory prohibitions creates an incoherent system that does more 
harm than good. 
This Comment argues that a unified federal approach is needed 
to remedy the problem and successfully control cyberstalking.  Part II 
addresses the current state-by-state approach, arguing that it is both 
deficient from a policy perspective and violative of the Dormant 
Commerce Clause.  Part III turns to the three federal statutes 
currently applied to quell cyberstalking, highlighting their own 
unique problems.  Part IV advocates one federal law, drafted broadly 
enough to encompass the increasingly broad array of cyberstalking 
activities.  More specifically, Part IV proposes that the federal 
government’s primary cyberstalking statute be amended to remove 
unnecessary procedural roadblocks, to expand the bases for 
prosecution, to standardize the government’s approach to 
cyberstalking, and to provide federal recourse for the victims of 
cyberstalking.  By adopting these proposals, the federal government 
will begin repairing the significant inadequacies of the present 
system. 
II.  A STATE-BY-STATE APPROACH TO CYBERSTALKING LEGISLATION IS 
INAPPROPRIATE 
It is undeniable that when we use the Internet, we do so without 
an appreciation of what state we are in.28  The Internet is an 
incorporeal space, devoid of artificial boundaries and topographical 
landmarks.29  As the District Court for the Southern District of New 
 
 26  See Naomi Harlin Goodno, Cyberstalking, A New Crime: Evaluating the Effectiveness 
of Current State and Federal Laws, 72 MO. L. REV. 125, 152 (2007); see infra text 
accompanying notes 45–56, 214–216, 230–236. 
 27  Goodno, supra note 26; see infra text accompanying notes 230–236. 
 28  See American Libraries Ass’n v. Pataki, 969 F. Supp. 160, 167 (S.D.N.Y. 1997). 
 29  See ACLU v. Reno, 929 F. Supp. 824, 837 (E.D. Pa. 1996) (the Internet is a 
“single body of knowledge”). 
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York noted in American Libraries Ass’n v. Pataki, “geography . . . is a 
virtually meaningless construct on the Internet.”30  Given this reality, 
laws addressing conduct on the Internet should reflect the notion 
that state boundaries have no meaning on the Internet and that 
individuals are likely unaware of the variations between states’ laws, 
or even, perhaps, in what state their Internet conduct is taking 
place.31 
Nevertheless, states have enacted and modified a broad array of 
statutes that address cyberstalking.32  These statutes fall into three 
general categories: (1) cyberstalking-specific laws;33 (2) general 
stalking laws that have been amended to cover cyberstalking;34 and 
(3) non-stalking laws applied to like conduct.35  What follows is a brief 
survey of current state approaches to cyberstalking, through which a 
few things should become clear.  The first is that states often have 
clever and efficient ways of drafting their statutes.  Their methods 
vary widely, however, and while certain elements of these statutes are 
commendable, the resulting inconsistency creates confusion and 
competing obligations for the Internet user.  Within the unique 
framework of the Internet landscape, this result should be 
impermissible.36  And as will be explained further below, these laws—
for many of the same reasons—also violate the Dormant Commerce 
Clause. 
 
 30  Pataki, 969 F. Supp. at 169. 
 31  See id. 
 32  See, e.g., ALASKA STAT. ANN. §§ 11.41.260, 11.41.270 (West 2006); ARK. CODE 
ANN. § 5-41-108 (West 2011); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 784.048 (West 2011); COLO. REV. 
STAT. § 602 (2010); 720 ILL. COMP. STAT. § 5/12-7.5 (2011); UTAH CODE ANN. § 106.5 
(2008); 13 VT. STAT. ANN. § 1027 (2011); WYO. STAT. ANN. § 6-2-506 (1977). 
 33  See, e.g., 720 ILL. COMP. STAT. § 5/12-7.5. 
 34  See, e.g., WYO. STAT. ANN. § 6-2-506. 
 35  See, e.g., 13 VT. STAT. ANN. § 1027. 
 36  Indeed, courts and commentators alike have long recognized the desirability 
of uniformity between the states in a wide variety of contexts.  See generally Perfect 10, 
Inc. v. CCBill LLC, 488 F.3d 1102, 1118 (9th Cir. 2007) (noting the inconsistency 
between states’ intellectual property laws, and concluding that allowing state laws to 
regulate Internet-based intellectual property would “be contrary to Congress’s 
expressed goal of insulating the development of the Internet from the various state-
law regimes[]”); Kenneth W. Swenson, A Stitch in Time: The Continental Shelf, 
Environmental Ethics, and Federalism, 60 S. CAL. L. REV. 851, 882 (1987) (noting the 
need for uniform legislation in the context of environmental regulation); Wendy 
Trahan, The Future of Sales and Use Tax on Electronic Commerce: Promoting Uniformity After 
Quill, 21 VA. TAX REV. 101, 117–18 (2001) (“Uniform sales and use tax legislation may 
reduce the burden on electronic commerce businesses that are subject to varying 
state and local government collection obligations.”).. 
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A.  State Law Inconsistencies 
Illinois is one of a few states that has passed a cyberstalking-
specific statute.  Its expansive law makes a first cyberstalking 
conviction a Class 4 felony.37  The law provides that someone 
“commits cyberstalking when he or she engages in a course of 
conduct using electronic communication directed at a specific 
person, and he or she knows or should know that would cause a 
reasonable person to” either “fear for his or her safety or the safety of 
a third person” or “suffer other emotional distress.”38  A person also 
commits cyberstalking “when he or she, knowingly and without lawful 
justification, on at least 2 separate occasions, harasses another 
person”—or solicits his or her harassment—through the use of 
electronic communication by transmitting a threat that places a 
“person in reasonable apprehension of immediate or future bodily 
harm.”39 
Although these two provisions are fairly standard, the legislature 
also included language unique to other cyberstalking laws.  
Specifically, the law also punishes one who “creates and maintains an 
Internet website or webpage” that harasses a person, communicates a 
threat, or solicits an act that would violate the provision.40  This 
subsection is important because it seemingly applies to the conduct 
of William Lawrence Cassidy, who, as mentioned above, was accused 
of posting threatening Twitter messages about Buddhist leader Alyce 
Zeoli.41  Furthermore, the provision appears to reach the conduct of 
defendants Baker and Gonda in Alkhabaz, whose indictments under a 
federal statute were dismissed, the court finding that their conduct, 
though “sadistic,” did not amount to “communication containing a 
threat.”42 
Whether Illinois’s statute would address either the online 
information gathering of Liam Youens43 or the “cyberstalking by 
proxy” of Jebidiah James Stipe,44 however, is an open question, devoid 
of guiding case law.  The statute would most likely not apply to 
 
 37  720 ILL. COMP. STAT. § 5/12-7.5. 
 38  Id. 
 39  Id. 
 40  Id. 
 41  Sengupta, supra note 17. 
 42  United States v. Alkhabaz, 104 F.3d 1492, 1497–98 (6th Cir. 1997).  The 
federal statue under which the  
defendants were charged was 18 U.S.C. § 875(c) (2012). 
 43  Wright, supra note 12. 
 44  Black, supra note 17. 
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Youens because of the “directed at a specific person” requirement.  
Although Youens did undergo a “course of conduct” directed at 
Boyer, it would be difficult to argue that the statutorily imperative 
portion of that course of conduct that occurred online was directed 
at her.  The statute’s applicability to Stipe’s conduct is a closer call.  
While no provision within the statute fits his conduct directly, a court 
could interpret each of the three to cover “cyberstalking by proxy.” 
Mississippi’s cyberstalking law contains four provisions,45 and 
differs from Illinois’s in certain respects.46  Under this statute, it is 
unlawful for a person to use in electronic communication “any words 
or language threatening to inflict bodily harm.”47  Second, it is 
unlawful to repeatedly contact another person electronically “for the 
purpose of threatening, terrifying or harassing” that person.48  The 
conduct prohibited by this provision would likely not be punishable 
by Illinois’s cyberstalking law, though the ultimate determination 
would depend on the content of the messages.  Third, it is unlawful 
to make false statements “concerning death, injury, illness, 
disfigurement, indecent conduct, or criminal conduct” about a 
person or his family “with the intent to threaten, terrify or harass.”49  
Finally, it is unlawful to “[k]nowingly permit an electronic 
communication device under the person’s control to be used for any 
purpose prohibited by this section.”50 
Although, again, the courts have been silent on the statute’s 
application, the statute’s language suggests that it fails to address all 
but the most conventional cyberstalking behavior.51  For instance, its 
provisions require the offender to contact the victim directly;52 
therefore, the statute will not attach to the online postings of Jake 
Baker and Arthur Gonda,53 the online information gathering of Liam 
Youens,54 the malicious Twitter postings of William Lawrence 
Cassidy,55 or the “cyberstalking by proxy” of Jebidiah James Stipe.56 
Interestingly, North Carolina’s cyberstalking statute mirrors 
 
 45  MISS. CODE ANN. § 97-45-15 (West 2003). 
 46  Compare id., with 720 ILL. COMP. STAT. § 5/12-7.5 (2011). 
 47  MISS. CODE ANN. § 97-45-15.  
 48  Id. 
 49  Id. 
 50  Id. 
 51  See id.  
 52  Id. 
 53  See United States v. Alkhabaz, 104 F.3d 1492, 1496 (6th Cir. 1997). 
 54  Wright, supra note 12. 
 55  Sengupta, supra note 17. 
 56  Black, supra note 17. 
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Mississippi’s statute nearly word for word.57  In fact, the only 
differences that can be found with respect to the prohibited conduct 
rest in the mens rea requirements of the second and third 
provisions.58  Where in Mississippi the conduct is unlawful if it is 
committed with the intent to threaten, terrify, or harass,59 the same 
conduct is unlawful in North Carolina if it is committed with the 
intent to “abuse, annoy, threaten, terrify, harass, or embarrass.”60  
Neither legislature explains the difference in mens rea, but North 
Carolina’s mens rea requirements reflect those in its pre-existing 
telephone harassment statute,61 suggesting that the matter is more 
one of statutory continuity than one of legislative precision. 
A more significant discrepancy between the two states’ statutes, 
however, resides in the their respective punishments.  In Mississippi, 
cyberstalking is a felony offense punishable by up to five years for a 
repeat offense; in North Carolina, on the other hand, cyberstalking is 
merely a Class 2 misdemeanor, with a maximum prison sentence of 
sixty days.62  As a result, individuals found guilty of exactly the same 
conduct face the prospect of very different punishments depending 
on the location of the offense.  It is this very type of disparity that 
renders the state statutory system so problematic. 
Another approach that states take is to amend traditional 
stalking statutes to encompass cyberstalking behavior.63  Wyoming’s 
astutely composed stalking statute punishes someone who, with the 
intent to harass, 
engages in a course of conduct reasonably likely to harass 
that person, including but not limited to any combination 
of the following: (i) [c]ommunicating, anonymously or 
otherwise, or causing a communication with another person 
by verbal [or] electronic . . . means in a manner that 
 
 57  Compare N.C. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 14-196.3 (West 2000), with MISS. CODE. ANN. § 
97-45-15. 
 58  Compare N.C. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 14-196.3, with MISS. CODE. ANN. § 97-45-15. 
 59  MISS. CODE ANN. § 97-45-15. 
 60  N.C. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 14-196.3 (emphasis added). 
 61  N.C. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 14-196 (West 2000). 
 62  MISS. CODE ANN. § 97-45-15 provides that cyberstalking is a “felony punishable 
by imprisonment for not more than two (2) years.”  If the communication contains a 
“credible threat,” however, or if the offense is a repeat offense, then it is “punishable 
by imprisonment for no more than five (5) years. MISS. CODE ANN. § 97-45-15.  In 
North Carolina, on the other hand, a class 2 misdemeanor carries a maximum prison 
sentence—even if the individual has committed five prior offenses—of sixty days in 
prison.  N.C. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 15A-1340.23 (West 1995).  
 63  See, e.g., ALASKA STAT. ANN. §§ 11.41.260, 11.41.270 (West 2006); WYO. STAT. 
ANN. § 6-2-506 (1977). 
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harasses; (ii) [f]ollowing a person . . . ; (iii) [p]lacing a 
person under surveillance . . . ; (iv) [o]therwise engaging in 
a course of conduct that harasses another person.64 
The Wyoming legislature recognized that, today, stalking takes place 
both online and off, and that an appropriate legislative response 
should allow the punishable course of conduct to remain similarly 
fluid.65  In recognition of this principle, the statute punishes acts that 
take place either online or in person, severing the distinction 
between traditional stalking and cyberstalking.  Because of this, 
Wyoming’s statute is the only law in this brief survey that would likely 
punish Liam Youens’s covert online surveillance.66  Moreover, its 
scope is broad enough that it might attach to Cassidy’s Twitter rants67 
and Stipe’s “cyberstalking by proxy.”68  In Wyoming, stalking is a 
misdemeanor.69 
A final group of state statutes attempt to address cyberstalking 
without utilizing either cyberstalking or traditional stalking 
language.70  For example, Vermont’s most closely applicable statute 
makes it a crime to, “with intent to terrify, intimidate, threaten, harass 
or annoy,” make contact with another and 
(i) make[] any request, suggestion or proposal which is 
obscene, lewd, lascivious or indecent; (ii) threaten[] to 
inflict injury or physical harm to the person or property of 
any person; or (iii) disturb[], or attempt[] to disturb, by 
repeated anonymous telephone calls or other electronic 
communications, whether or not conversation ensues[.]71 
Despite the absence of specific stalking or cyberstalking 
terminology,72 the statute’s language reflects that of many other 
 
 64  WYO. STAT. ANN. § 6-2-506(b) (1977). 
 65  Id. 
 66  Wright, supra note 12. 
 67  Sengupta, supra note 17. 
 68  Black, supra note 17. 
 69  WYO. STAT. ANN. § 6-2-506 (1977). 
 70  See, e.g., VA. CODE ANN. § 18.2–60 (2002). 
 71  13 VT. STAT. ANN. § 1027. 
 72  Vermont’s law does, however, contain an interesting jurisdictional provision. 
“An offense committed . . . as set forth in this section shall be considered to have 
been committed at either the place where the telephone call or calls originated or at 
the place where the communication or communications or calls were received.”  Id.  
This language is strange, because, according to a plain reading of the provision, 
when the crime’s setting is based on the “origination,” rather than the “receipt,” of a 
message, only a telephone call may form the basis of jurisdiction.  If the message was 
created on a computer, the only place where a crime may be committed is where the 
message was received.  Though no findings state so explicitly, this discrepancy may 
be an attempt to avoid the problem of states prosecuting out-of-state residents who 
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states, and would probably apply both to Cassidy’s Twitter 
harassment73 and to Stipe’s “cyberstalking by proxy.”74  It would likely 
not, however, punish Jake Baker, Arthur Gonda,75 or Liam Youens,76 
because it requires the individual to make contact with the victim.77  
Given the statute’s similarity to those of other states, it is perhaps 
strange that a conviction under this statute exposes the defendant to 
a maximum punishment of only three months of imprisonment and 
a fine of $250.0078—a true disparity when viewed in light of other 
states’ responses.79 
This brief survey of state cyberstalking statutes demonstrates that 
states have different opinions about the harms that cyberstalking 
presents, and different approaches in addressing them.  While these 
laws contain valuable provisions that the federal government would 
be wise to adopt, the significant overlap between them creates a web 
of inconsistency that, as a public policy matter, should render them 
unenforceable.80  The Internet landscape is too devoid of cognizable 
boundaries to allow individual states to carve out wide prohibitions. 
B.  The State Approach Violates the Dormant Commerce Clause 
Not only are the inconsistencies in the state-law approach 
problematic from a public policy perspective, these inconsistencies 
also render the state statutes violative of the Dormant Commerce 
Clause.  As a general matter, the Dormant Commerce Clause “is the 
principle that state and local laws are unconstitutional if they place 
an undue burden on interstate commerce.”81  If a law does not 
 
contact victims within the state.  Then again, it is difficult to see why that rationale 
would not extend to telephone communications as well as computer 
communications. 
 73  Sengupta, supra note 17. 
 74  Black, supra note 17. 
 75  See United States v. Alkhabaz, 104 F.3d 1492 (6th Cir. 1997).   
 76  Wright, supra note 12. 
 77  13 VT. STAT. ANN. § 1027. 
 78  Id. 
 79  In Illinois, cyberstalking is a class 4 felony.  720 ILL. COMP. STAT. § 5/12-7.5 
(2011).  Under Illinois law, a class 4 felony is punishable by a sentence of “not less 
than one year and not more than three years.”  730 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/5-4.5-45 
(2012).  In Mississippi and North Carolina, as noted, the maximum sentences are five 
years and sixty days, respectively.  Supra note 6262.  In Rhode Island, the sentence 
can be as long as two years.  R.I. GEN. LAWS ANN. § 11-52-4.2 (West 2008).   
 80  For a similar view on the “smorgasbord” of state cyberstalking law, see Harry A. 
Valetk, Mastering the Dark Arts of Cyberspace: A Quest for Sound Internet Safety Policies, 
2004 STAN. TECH. L. REV. 2, 70–77 (2004). 
 81  ERWIN CHEMERINSKY, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW, PRINCIPLES AND POLICIES 419 (Vicki 
Been et al. eds., 3d ed. 2006). 
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discriminate against non-residents, then the court employs a 
balancing test first articulated in Pike v. Brace Church, Inc.82  According 
to this test, a facially nondiscriminatory law that regulates a legitimate 
local interest and has only incidental effects on interstate commerce 
“will be upheld unless the burden imposed upon such commerce is 
clearly excessive in relation to the putative local benefits.”83 
As commentators have noted, however, the Dormant Commerce 
Clause “does not end with the Pike Test.”84  State laws may also be 
struck down on the bases of “extraterritoriality” or “inconsistent 
obligations.”85  The “extraterritoriality” doctrine was central to the 
Supreme Court’s decision in Healy v. Beer Inst., Inc.86  At issue in Healy 
was a Connecticut statute that required out-of-state beer shippers to 
affirm that their prices were no higher than prices in the surrounding 
states.87  The Court surveyed its extraterritoriality decisions, finding 
that the Dormant Commerce Clause invalidated state laws that 
regulated commerce taking place wholly outside of the state.88  In 
such a case, it did not matter whether the statute’s “extraterritorial 
reach was intended by the legislature.”89  More important were the 
practical effects of the regulation and the statute’s potential 
interaction with other states’ legitimate statutory regimes.90  Because 
the affirmation statute had “the undeniable effect of controlling 
commercial activity occurring wholly outside the boundary of the 
State,” the Court invalidated it.91 
State laws may also violate the Dormant Commerce Clause in 
another—and not entirely unrelated—way.92  If a law has the 
potential to “subject an area of interstate commerce to inconsistent 
state regulation,” the Dormant Commerce Clause is violated.93  This 
 
 82  397 U.S. 137 (1970). 
 83  Id. at 142. 
 84  See, e.g., Chi Pann, Comment, The Dormant Commerce Clause and State Regulation 
of the Internet: Are Laws Protecting Minors From Sexual Predators Different From Those 
Protecting Minors From Sexually Explicit Materials?, 2005 DUKE L. & TECH. REV., No. 8, at 
5 (2005).   
 85  Id. at 5–6. 
 86  491 U.S. 324 (1989).   
 87  Id.   
 88  Id. at 336 (citing Edgar v. MITE Corp., 457 U.S. 624, 642–43 (1982)). 
 89  Id. 
 90  Id. at 336–37.  
 91  Id. at 337. 
 92  See Cooley v. Bd. of Wardens of Port of Phila., 53 U.S. 299 (1851). 
 93  Pann, supra note 84, at 17 (citing Bibb v. Navajo Freight Lines, Inc., 359 U.S. 
520, 529–30 (1959) (striking down a state highway regulation); S. Pac. Co. v. Sullivan, 
325 U.S. 761, 779–82 (1945) (striking down a state railroad regulation)).  
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principle has its roots in early Commerce Clause analysis.94  In Cooley, 
the Court noted that “[w]hatever subjects of this power are in their 
nature national, or admit only of one uniform system, or plan of 
regulation, may justly be said to be of such a nature as to require 
exclusive legislation by Congress.”95  The Court thus recognized that 
some conduct, by its very nature, requires a uniform set of laws, only 
appropriately provided by Congress.96 
Of the three tests, the Pike test is the most clearly defined, and is 
generally accepted amongst commentators.97  Beyond that, however, 
disputes arise.  Some persuasively argue that the extraterritoriality 
and inconsistent obligations bases are merely considerations under 
the Pike test.98  Meanwhile, others maintain that those tests are distinct 
from the Pike test, and are independently sufficient to invalidate state 
laws.99  A third contingent reads the jurisprudence as endorsing two 
of the above three tests.100 Despite the confusion, these tests clearly 
inform modern Dormant Commerce Clause analysis, and all three 
have been used to evaluate state laws that regulate Internet use, most 
notably in American Libraries Ass’n v. Pataki.101  Because the statute at 
issue in Pataki resembles the cyberstalking statutes at issue here,102 the 
Pataki decision serves as an important touchstone for the Dormant 
Commerce Clause analysis of state cyberstalking laws. 
 
 94  See Cooley, 53 U.S. at 299. 
 95  Id. at 319.   
 96  Id. 
 97  Pann, supra note 84, at 18.  
 98  For instance, Goldsmith and Sykes present a compelling argument that the 
“real concern underlying the extraterritoriality and inconsistent-regulations prongs 
of dormant Commerce Clause analysis is not out-of-state effects and nonuniformity 
per se, but rather whether the out-of-state burdens of a regulation outweigh its local 
benefits.”  Jack L. Goldsmith & Alan O. Sykes, The Internet and the Dormant Commerce 
Clause, 110 YALE L.J. 785, 827 (2001). 
 99  Pann, supra note 84, at 18.  
 100  Michael W. Loudenslager, although acknowledging the three doctrines do at 
least nominally exist in the jurisprudence, notes that courts have treated the 
“inconsistent obligations” test “as effectively a preemption analysis.”  Michael W. 
Loudenslager, Allowing Another Policeman on the Information Superhighway: State Interests 
and Federalism on the Internet in the Face of the Dormant Commerce Clause, 17 BYU J. PUB. L. 
191, 230 (2003).  Loudenslager recognizes the Pike balancing test and, relying heavily 
on Healy, the extraterritoriality analysis as the two bases for invalidating 
nondiscriminatory state laws under the Dormant Commerce Clause.  Id. at 213–17.  
Peter C. Felmy goes in a different direction, suggesting that the “extraterritoriality” 
rationale be separated from Dormant Commerce Clause analysis altogether.  Peter C. 
Felmy, Beyond the Reach of the States: The Dormant Commerce Clause, Extraterritorial State 
Legislation, and the Concerns of Federalism, 55 ME. L. REV. 467 (2003). 
 101  969 F. Supp. 160 (S.D.N.Y. 1997). 
 102  See supra Part II.A. 
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Pataki pitted a broad array of interest groups and organizations 
against the Governor and the Attorney General of New York.103  At 
issue was the constitutionality of a New York law that made it a felony 
to knowingly transmit to a minor, using a computer, material that is 
harmful to minors.104  The court concluded that the statute violated 
the Dormant Commerce Clause on all three of the grounds detailed 
above—the Pike balancing test, extraterritoriality, and inconsistent 
obligations.105 
First, the court addressed the extraterritoriality defect of the 
New York law.106  The court noted that the “nature of the Internet 
makes it impossible to restrict the effects of the New York Act to 
conduct occurring within New York.”107  Non-New Yorkers, in other 
words, could not prevent their transmissions from entering New York.  
This made them potentially subject to the New York statute’s 
jurisdiction.108  As a result, the statute had the practical effect of 
regulating conduct wholly outside of the state.109  This encroachment, 
the court held, rendered the New York Act “per se violative of the 
[Dormant] Commerce Clause.”110 
Next, the court analyzed the law under the Pike balancing test.111  
While the court accepted that protecting children against pedophilia 
was a legitimate state interest, it held that any benefit derived from 
the law was outweighed by its burden on interstate commerce.112  For 
one, the statute would not—indeed could not—have an effect on 
international communications.113  Further, the effective prosecution 
of the statute would require pursuing out-of-staters, and that process 
would be “beset with practical difficulties.”114  And because New York 
 
 103  These organizations included: American Library Association, Freedom to 
Read Foundation, Inc., New York Library Association, Westchester Library System, 
American Booksellers Foundation For Free Expression, Association of American 
Publishers, Bibliobytes, Magazine Publishers of America, Interactive Digital Software 
Association, Public Access Networks Corporation, ECHO, New York City Net, Art on 
the Net, Peacefire, and the American Civil Liberties Union.  Pataki, 969 F. Supp. at 
161–62. 
 104  Id. at 161–63.  The law at issue was N.Y. Penal Law § 235.21. 
 105  Id. at 169; see Pann, supra note 84. 
 106  Pataki, 969 F. Supp. at 173. 
 107  Id. at 177. 
 108  Pann, supra note 84, at 21. 
 109  Pataki, 969 F. Supp. at 177. 
 110  Id. 
 111  Id.  
 112  Id. at 177–78. 
 113  Id. at 178. 
 114  Id.  
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had other laws aimed at preventing similar harms, any benefits would 
be confined to the narrow class of cases falling outside the scope of 
existing laws.115  The court balanced this relatively minor benefit 
against the law’s significant burdens on interstate commerce, 
including the “extreme burden” on interstate commerce, the 
“chilling effect” on out of state Internet users, and the “excessive” 
costs of enforcement.116  Because, on balance, the burdens of the law 
on interstate commerce outweighed its local benefits, the law failed 
the Pike test and violated the Dormant Commerce Clause. 117 
Finally, the court decided that the statute was invalid because it 
risked imposing upon individuals inconsistent obligations.118  The 
court, channeling Cooley, noted, 
[t]he courts have long recognized that certain types of 
commerce demand consistent treatment and are therefore 
susceptible to regulation only on a national level.  The 
Internet represents one of those areas; effective regulation 
will require national, and more likely global, cooperation.  
Regulation by any single state can only result in chaos, 
because at least some states will likely enact laws subjecting 
Internet users to conflicting obligations.119 
As an illustration of the difficulties that would attend the upholding 
of the law, the court referred to the legal standard upon which 
conviction would turn.120  The material sent must be “harmful to 
minors,” which was defined, in part, as being “patently offensive to 
prevailing standards in the adult community as a whole.”121  The 
problem with this standard is that “there is no single ‘prevailing 
community standard’ in the United States.”122  Therefore, to avoid the 
possibility of prosecution, the Internet user must either comply with 
the most stringent regulation or forego communication entirely.123  
Because the risk of imposing inconsistent obligations is impermissible 
under the Dormant Commerce Clause, the court struck down the 
law.124 
In the wake of Pataki, other courts struck down similar laws, 
 
 115  Pataki, 969 F. Supp. at 179. 
 116  Pann, supra note 844, at 23 (citing Pataki, 969 F. Supp. at 179–80). 
 117  Pataki, 969 F. Supp. at 181. 
 118  Id.  
 119  Id.   
 120  Id. at 182.  
 121  Id.  
 122  Id.   
 123  Pataki, 969 F. Supp. at 183. 
 124  Id.  
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largely employing the same rationale as the Pataki court.125  Not all 
courts, however, were persuaded.  The courts in the latter category—
overwhelmingly (and perhaps unsurprisingly) state courts—drew 
distinctions between the statute at issue in Pataki and those at issue in 
their cases, concluding that their statutes satisfied the Dormant 
Commerce Clause.126 
Representative of those cases is a California decision, Hatch v. 
Superior Court.127  Hatch involved a statute similar to that in Pataki, 
making it “a criminal offense to send, by any means, specified harmful 
matter to a minor ‘with the intent or for the purpose of seducing a 
minor.’”128  Despite the similarities to the statute in Pataki, the 
California law survived its Dormant Commerce Clause challenge.129  
The court distinguished Pataki on two grounds.  First, the court 
focused on the “intent-to-seduce” requirement.  In the court’s view, 
a ban on communication of specified matter to a minor for 
purposes of seduction can only affect the rights of the very 
narrow class of adults who intend to engage in sex with 
minors.  We have found no case which gives such intentions 
or the communications employed in realizing them 
protection under the dormant Commerce Clause.130 
In other words, because the commerce in question was not legal 
under the laws of California, the Dormant Commerce Clause should 
not apply.131 
Second, the court held that the statute would not likely affect 
interstate commerce, citing California penal statutes that prevent 
punishment for wholly extraterritorial offenses.132  The court thus 
upheld the statute.133 
Hatch and similar cases,134 however, were wrongly decided.  The 
distinctions the Hatch court drew from the statute in Pataki are, under 
 
 125  See PSINet, Inc. v. Chapman, 362 F.3d 227 (4th Cir. 2004); Am. Booksellers 
Found. v. Dean, 342 F.3d 96 (2d Cir. 2003); ACLU v. Johnson, 194 F.3d 1149 (10th 
Cir. 1999); Cyberspace Commc’ns, Inc. v. Engler, 142 F. Supp. 2d 827 (E.D. Mich. 
2001).  
 126  See People v. Hsu, 99 Cal. Rptr. 2d 184 (Cal. Ct. App. 2000); Hatch v. Sup. Ct., 
94 Cal. Rptr. 2d 453 (Cal. Ct. App. 2000); State v. Heckel, 24 P.3d 404 (Wash. 2001). 
 127  94 Cal. Rptr. 2d 453. 
 128  Id. at 459 (citing CAL. PENAL CODE § 288.2(a) (West 2012)).   
 129  Id.  
 130  Id. at 472. 
 131  See id. 
 132  Id. at 473. 
 133  Hatch, 94 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 473.  The Hsu court utilized this same argument as 
well.  People v. Hsu, 99 Cal. Rptr. 2d 184, 191–92 (Cal. Ct. App. 2000). 
 134  See, e.g., Hsu, 99 Cal. Rptr. 2d 184; State v. Heckel, 24 P.3d 404 (Wash. 2001). 
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scrutiny, untenable.  The Hatch court’s first error was the weight that 
it afforded the statute’s mens rea requirement.  The reason that the 
intent element was important, it declared, was because it narrowed 
the range of banned conduct—it would, in the court’s words, “only 
affect the rights of the very narrow class of adults who intend to 
engage in sex with minors.”135  Echoing that sentiment, California’s 
Fifth District Court of Appeal noted, in a similar case, People v. Hsu, 
that “it is difficult to conceive of any legitimate commerce that would be 
burdened by penalizing the transmission of harmful sexual material 
known to minors in order to seduce them.”136  These courts erred in 
their failure to recognize that the legitimacy or illegitimacy—that is, 
the legality or illegality—of commerce is itself a legal conclusion, 
dependent upon the particular law that a court is referencing. 
For example, consider the statute at issue in Hatch and Hsu, 
which prohibited sending harmful material to a minor “with the 
intent or for the purpose of seducing a minor.”137  Because states have 
different ages of consent, an adult in one state could be seducing 
someone online whom he legitimately believes to be of age in his 
state.  In his own state, he would not be committing a crime, because 
the object of his seduction, by his own state’s law, would not be a 
minor.  But because his target happens to reside in California—a fact 
he may have no way of knowing—he would be subject to prosecution 
in California.  Because, in these cases the legitimacy of commerce 
depends upon standards particular to state law, the commerce’s 
legitimacy or illegitimacy will vary from state to state.  Therefore, the 
courts’ reliance on mens rea was an ineffective distinction from the 
result in Pataki. 
The Hatch court’s second error was its reliance on California’s 
general bar on “punishment for wholly extraterritorial offenses”138 as 
an indication that California would not pursue out-of-state offenders 
for these types of crimes.  As Alex McDonald notes, California courts 
have repeatedly upheld convictions of individuals for crimes whose 
results occurred in California, but whose conduct took place wholly 
outside of California.139  An even more recent example confirms this 
 
 135  Hatch, 94 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 471. 
 136  Hsu, 99 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 190 (emphasis added).  Hsu involved the same statute 
that was at issue in Hatch.  Compare id. at 192, with Hatch, 94 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 463. 
 137  CAL. PENAL CODE § 288.2(a) (West 2012). 
 138  Hatch, 94 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 473. 
 139  Alex C. McDonald, Dissemination of Harmful Matter to Minors Over the Internet, 12 
SETON HALL CONST. L.J. 163 (2001).  As McDonald notes: 
In Ex Parte Hedley [31 Cal. 108 (1866)], the California Supreme Court 
upheld the embezzlement conviction in California under California 
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point.  In People v. Betts, the Supreme Court of California held that “a 
state may exercise jurisdiction over criminal acts that take place 
outside of the state if the results of the crime are intended to, and do, 
cause harm within the state.”140  So even though it might be true that 
California will not pursue out-of-state offenders for wholly 
extraterritorial crimes, it is equally true that the conduct at issue in 
Hatch and Hsu was not wholly extraterritorial, because its results took 
place within the state.141 
Moreover, even if it may be true that “there is no reason to 
suppose California would attempt to impose its policies on other 
states,”142 statutes that regulate extraterritorially are “invalid regardless 
of whether the statute’s extraterritorial reach was intended by the 
legislature.”143  Furthermore, the statute must be considered in light 
of “what effect would arise if not one, but many or every, State 
adopted similar legislation.”144  While it might be true that California 
would not pursue out-of-state offenders, as a logical matter, if at least 
one state permits prosecution of out-of-state conduct, then the entire 
Internet community is subject to inconsistent obligations.  The user 
will have to abide by the laws of his state as well as the laws of the state 
that extends its reach beyond its geographical boundaries.  
Therefore, under Healy, even if California truly did not intend to 
assert its extraterritorial reach, the statute would still be invalid.145 
As a result of the weaknesses in the Hatch line of cases, Pataki 
 
law of the defendant, who in Nevada drew checks on his employer’s 
account and sent them to California to be cashed.  In People v. Sansom 
[37 Cal. App. 435 (C.A. Sec. Dis. Cal. 1918)], the California court 
upheld the forgery (uttering) conviction in California under California 
law of the defendant, who forged a check in Mexico and sent it to his 
agent in California for deposit in an Arizona bank.  Receipt in 
California of an Internet communication sent from another state seems 
indistinguishable from receipt in California of a forged check sent 
from another state.  It therefore appears that California criminal 
jurisdiction permits prosecution in California under section 288.2(b) 
California Penal Code of a person who sends an Internet 
communication from another state that is received in California, and 
otherwise satisfies the elements of the statute. 
Id. at 213–14. 
 140  People v. Betts, 23 Cal. Rptr. 3d 138, 142 (Cal. 2005). 
 141  See Hatch, 94 Cal. Rptr. 2d 453; Hsu, 99 Cal. Rptr. 2d 184. 
 142  Hatch, 94 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 473. 
 143  Healy v. Beer Inst., Inc., 491 U.S. 324, 336 (1989).  The Hsu court betrays its 
ignorance of this critical point by noting that the statute “makes no reference to 
place of performance, so courts must assume the Legislature did not intend to 
regulate conduct taking place outside the state.”  Hsu, 99 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 192. 
 144  Healy, 491 U.S. at 336. 
 145  Id. at 336. 
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emerges as the more persuasive authority both from a legal and 
public policy perspective.  The principles that drove the decision in 
Pataki are highly relevant to the legitimacy of the state statutory 
approach to cyberstalking.  Consider, for example, a hypothetical 
Dormant Commerce Clause analysis of the Illinois cyberstalking 
statute, applying the principles at work in Pataki.146 
C.  A Dormant Commerce Clause Analysis of Illinois’s Cyberstalking 
Statute 
First, we must consider the extraterritoriality doctrine.  Under 
Healy, a statute “that directly controls commerce occurring wholly 
outside the boundaries of a State” is invalid under the Dormant 
Commerce Clause.147  If the practical effect of the law is to control 
conduct in other states, it is invalid, regardless of the legislature’s 
intent.148  Illinois’s law contains no geographic limitation; its 
provisions apply to all electronic communication, without reference 
to where the sender physically resides.149  Under a plain reading of 
the law, an individual outside of Illinois could initiate online contact 
with an individual in Illinois and violate any of the three provisions of 
the law, subjecting himself to prosecution in Illinois.  Perhaps the 
Illinois law’s final provision draws this into clearest relief:150 a person 
who creates a webpage about another person does not directly 
communicate with his victim; rather, he displays his message to the 
Internet community at large, in whatever state the recipient may 
reside.  Because the website’s creator does not have control over 
where his website is accessible, he must either comply with Illinois’s 
unique law or forgo his communication entirely.  This is precisely the 
choice to which the extraterritoriality doctrine is directed, and as a 
result the Illinois statute violates the Dormant Commerce Clause. 
If the Pataki court’s application of the Pike test is accepted, it will 
also doom Illinois’s statute.  As mentioned, the Pike test involves a 
two-step inquiry.151  First, the court must examine the legitimacy of 
the state’s interest.  It is difficult to contest the validity of the interest 
here, and a court would most likely assume its validity.  Next, the 
court must determine whether the burden to interstate commerce 
 
 146  Recall Illinois’s cyberstalking-specific statute.  Supra Part II.A.  
 147  Healy, 491 U.S. at 336.  
 148  Id. 
 149  720 ILL. COMP. STAT. § 5/12-7.5 (2011). 
 150  See supra text accompanying notes 37–40. 
 151  Pike v. Brace Church, Inc., 397 U.S. 137, 142 (1970). 
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outweighs the state’s interest.152  It was at this point that the Pataki 
court balked, and the court’s arguments resonate in this context as 
well.  First, the “practical difficulties” involved with enforcement of 
the statute reduce the significance of the local benefit—for example, 
Illinois could not prevent online harassment from international 
sources.153  It also might be cost prohibitive to prosecute individuals 
whose only contact with the state “occurs via the Internet.”154  
Furthermore, the “chilling effect” discussed in Pataki is also present 
here, and “Internet users will steer clear of the Act by significant 
margin,” thereby burdening interstate commerce.155  For these 
reasons, the Illinois law would probably be invalidated under the Pike 
test as well. 
Finally, the Illinois statute violates the Dormant Commerce 
Clause on the basis of the inconsistent obligations it imposes on 
Internet users.  Every state espouses different values, and these values 
are inevitably reflected in the state’s legal code.  Illinois’s statute—
and in particular subsection (a)(5)—is unique.156  It is not an 
unreasonable provision, but at this point, Illinois is the only state to 
employ such language.157  In every other state—assuming the 
language in other states’ statutes will not be stretched beyond 
cognizance—such conduct is legal.  But an Internet user creating or 
maintaining such an Internet site in any other state must be aware 
not only of the laws of his own state, but also of this Illinois law.  
These are precisely the inconsistent obligations that violate the 
Dormant Commerce Clause.158 
This Comment does not argue that the state statutes are, by and 
large, poorly drafted, or that they are wrongheaded responses to the 
social ills wrought by cyberstalking.  Instead, this Comment argues 
that a state-by-state approach to cyberstalking reflects poor public 
policy and violates the Dormant Commerce Clause.  These laws reach 
beyond their states’ boundaries, they impose inconsistent obligations 
upon Internet users, and by and large they impose a greater burden 
on interstate commerce than is justified by the harm they target.  In 
 
 152  Id. 
 153  See Am. Libraries Ass’n v. Pataki, 969 F. Supp. 160, 171 (S.D.N.Y. 1997). 
 154  Id. at 178.   
 155  Id. at 179.   
 156  720 ILL. COMP. STAT. § 5/12-7.5 (2011). 
 157  See id. 
 158  Here we again witness the overlap between the extraterritoriality and 
inconsistent obligations doctrines.  While this overlap exposes the uncertainty of 
current law, it does not undermine the legal conclusions derived from the doctrines. 
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the “decentralized, global communications medium”159 that is the 
Internet, these scattered laws are an incomplete and unsatisfying 
solution.  Because cyberstalking and the harms that it creates 
routinely “travel” across state boundaries, sound jurisprudence and 
public policy demonstrate that an appropriate response to 
cyberstalking is a unified federal system.  The ideal federal approach 
will utilize the best parts of the state statutes—like Illinois’s creation-
or-maintenance-of-a-website provision and Wyoming’s implicit 
recognition that much stalking activity today vacillates fluidly between 
online and offline conduct—and simultaneously remedy the state-by-
state approach’s significant shortcomings. 
III.  THE CURRENT FEDERAL APPROACH TO CYBERSTALKING IS LACKING 
Today, three federal statutes apply to adult cyberstalking 
behavior.160  One provision of one statute161 is directed specifically at 
cyberstalking; the others are slightly different statutes that courts have 
adapted to cyberstalking as a matter of convenience.162  As a practical 
matter, however, the cyberstalking statute and other applicable 
statutes constitute an inefficient and substandard regime.  The 
following section describes the existing statutes and addresses their 
respective deficiencies. 
A.  18 U.S.C. § 2261A 
This statute is the federal government’s primary vehicle for 
combating stalking and cyberstalking.  It contains two provisions, one 
dedicated to each.  Section (1) is a fairly broad physical stalking 
statute.163  It serves its limited purpose well, but standing alone it is an 
 
 159  Pataki, 969 F. Supp. at 164. 
 160  See 18 U.S.C. § 2261A (2006); 18 U.S.C. § 875 (2006); 47 U.S.C. § 223 (2006).  
Another statute, 18 U.S.C. § 2425, prohibits the transmission of certain information 
to a minor with the “intent to entice, encourage, offer, or solicit any person to 
engage in any sexual activity for which any person can be charged with a criminal 
offense.”  18 U.S.C. § 2425 (2006).  While this statute certainly has value, it is aimed 
at a different harm than the harm discussed in this Comment, and is outside of its 
scope.  For a discussion of the application of cyberstalking law to children, see 
Kimberly Wingteung Seto, How Should Legislation Deal With Children as the Victims and 
Perpetrators of Cyberstalking?, 9 CARDOZO WOMEN’S L.J. 67 (2002). 
 161  18 U.S.C. § 2261A. 
 162  18 U.S.C. § 875; 47 U.S.C. § 223; 18 U.S.C. § 2425. 
 163  18 U.S.C. § 2261A(1). 
Whoever . . . travels in interstate or foreign commerce . . . with the 
intent to kill, injure, harass, or place under surveillance with intent to 
kill, injure, harass, or intimidate another person, and in the course of, 
or as a result of, such travel places that person in reasonable fear of the 
death of, or serious bodily injury to, or causes substantial emotional 
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insufficient tool to combat cyberstalking. 
Section (2) is the federal government’s cyberstalking 
provision.164  Given its importance, it is reproduced below, in full. 
Whoever 
(2) with the intent— 
(A) to kill, injure, harass, or place under 
surveillance with intent to kill, injure, harass, or 
intimidate, or cause substantial emotional distress 
to a person in another State or tribal jurisdiction 
or within the special maritime and territorial 
jurisdiction of the United States; or 
 
(B) to place a person in another State or tribal 
jurisdiction, or within the special maritime and 
territorial jurisdiction of the United States, in 
reasonable fear of the death of, or serious bodily 
injury to— 
(i) that person; 
(ii) a member of the immediate family (as 
defined in section 115) of that person; or 
(iii) a spouse or intimate partner of that 
person; 
uses the mail, any interactive computer service, or any 
facility of interstate or foreign commerce to engage in 
a course of conduct that causes substantial emotional 
distress to that person or places that person in 
reasonable fear of the death of, or serious bodily injury 
to, any of the persons described in clauses (i) through 
(iii) of subparagraph (B); shall be punished as 
provided in section 2261(b) of this title.165 
For reasons explained below, this provision has been used 
sparingly.  But when the government has employed the statute, it has 
proved effective.  In United States v. Bowker, the victim, Tina Knight, 
began receiving threatening and vulgar e-mails from several different 
e-mail addresses.166  An initial FBI investigation of the 
communications revealed Erik Bowker as the sender, and Knight 
 
distress to that person, a member of the immediate family (as defined 
in section 115) of that person, or the spouse or intimate partner of that 
person. 
Id. 
 164  18 U.S.C. § 2261A(2). 
 165  Id. 
 166  372 F.3d 365, 371 (6th Cir. 2004), vacated, 543 U.S. 1182 (2005). 
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procured a cease and desist order.167  Bowker, however, continued to 
send threatening e-mails, phone calls, and letters both to Knight and 
to her family, suggesting that he would use violence against her.168  
Furthermore, Bowker traveled from his residence in Ohio to Knight’s 
in West Virginia to take photographs of her place of work and to steal 
her mail.169  On appeal, the Sixth Circuit found that Bowker 
“intended to instill in Knight a fear of death or serious bodily harm 
through use of the mails and other facilities of interstate commerce,” 
and that he was guilty under § 2261A(2).170 
In United States v. Rose, a California man, Richard Rose, was 
accused of cyberstalking a Minnesota woman, Lois Fischer.171  The two 
had met online while playing a card game, and a romance 
blossomed.172  They exchanged “cyber vows” and agreed to meet in 
California, while Fischer was on a business trip.173  When the time 
came, however, Fischer got cold feet, and she refused to meet Rose.174  
Rose tracked her down to her hotel and called her on the 
telephone.175  But when Fischer’s husband answered (Fischer had told 
him she was widowed), Rose became enraged, and responded by 
sending her a barrage of vulgar and threatening e-mails, including 
death threats to Fischer’s children.176  Rose also posted pictures of 
Fischer’s children online, “along with their full names, address, and 
telephone number, on web sites soliciting sexual activity.”177  Perhaps 
unsurprisingly, Rose was convicted under § 2261A(2).178 
One recent case is also worthy of note.  Shawn Memarian 
pleaded guilty to cyberstalking under § 2261A(1) in early 2009.179  
Memarian had dated his victim—a Missouri, then Colorado, 
resident—for approximately one month.180  After the relationship 
 
 167  Id. at 372. 
 168  Id.  
 169  Id. at 373. 
 170  Id. at 388.  Bowker was appealing his convictions under 18 U.S.C. § 2261A(1), 
47 U.S.C. § 223(a)(1)(C), and 18 U.S.C. § 1708.  Id. at 370, 388.  
 171  315 F.3d 956, 957 (8th Cir. 2003). 
 172  Id. 
 173  Id. 
 174  Id. 
 175  Id. 
 176  Id. 
 177  Rose, 315 F.3d at 957. 
 178  Id. at 956.  Rose was also convicted under 18 U.S.C. § 875(c).  Id. 
 179  United States v. Memarian, 371 Fed. Appx. 711, 711 (8th Cir. 2010).  
 180  News Release, U.S. Dep’t of Justice, KC Man Sentenced for Cyberstalking: 
False Website Ads Invited Strangers to Victim’s Home for Sexual Encounters (June 
17, 2009), available at http://www.justice.gov/usao/mow/news2009/memarian.sen 
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ended, Memarian began a wide-ranging course of online 
harassment.181  He sent her “more than 75 threatening e-mails.”182  
Worse, Memarian, posing as his victim, created false personal ads 
describing the victim as a “sex freak,” which he posted on MySpace 
and Facebook.183  In all, approximately thirty men responded to the 
ads, some showing up to the victim’s house at night.184  What is 
notable about Memarian’s plea is that it might suggest that his latter 
conduct—”cyberstalking by proxy”185—falls within the reach of 
§ 2261A(2).  But given that there was no trial—and that Memarian’s 
sending of seventy-five threatening e-mails alone would likely have 
been sufficient to garner a conviction under § 2261A(2)—concluding 
so may be premature. 
Indeed, some commentators are convinced that § 2261A(2) 
would not cover “cyberstalking by proxy,” like that of Jebidiah James 
Stipe.186  According to Naomi Harlin Goodno, for all the good 
§ 2261A(2) does, it still fails to “squarely deal with situations where 
the cyberstalker pretends to be the victim and encourages third 
parties to innocently harass the victim, such as posting sexual 
invitations on a message board in the name of the victim to dupe 
third parties to respond.”187  Given the increasing prevalence of such 
conduct, an effective federal statute should clearly encompass this 
harm. 
An even more recent case, mentioned previously, adds an 
interesting twist to the general applicability and efficacy of § 2261A.  
William Lawrence Cassidy was charged with cyberstalking under 
section § 2261A(2)(A) for a series of Twitter and blog postings 
directed at Buddhist figure Alyce Zeoli.188  Under a series of aliases, 
Cassidy unleashed a virulent barrage of messages directed at Zeoli.189  
These messages ranged from pointed religious criticism (“(A.Z.) is a 
demonic force who tries to destroy Buddhism”) to sinister and thinly 
veiled threats (“Rain tomorrow should cover the tracks”).190 In the 
end, Cassidy published about 8,000 tweets, most directed towards 
 
.htm.  
 181  Id.  
 182  Id.  
 183  Id.  
 184  Id.  
 185  Sullivan, supra note 17. 
 186  Black, supra note 17. 
 187  Goodno, supra note 26, at 152. 
 188  United States v. Cassidy, 814 F. Supp. 2d 574, 576 (D. Md. 2011). 
 189  Id. 
 190  Id. app. A. 
O’CONNOR (DO NOT DELETE) 5/28/2013  1:46 PM 
1030 SETON HALL LAW REVIEW [Vol. 43:1007 
Zeoli.191 
In December 2011, the District Court for the District of 
Maryland dismissed Cassidy’s indictment, holding that, as applied to 
Cassidy, § 2261A(2)(A) was an unconstitutional infringement on his 
First Amendment right to free speech.192  In reaching its conclusion, 
the court relied on a few important propositions.  First, the court 
analogized Twitter to a colonial-era bulletin board.193  Like a bulletin 
board, which can be ignored simply by not walking over to the board, 
Twitter allows users to ignore messages they do not want to view by 
either “blocking” or “unfollowing” the sender of the offending 
messages.194  According to the court, “[t]his is in sharp contrast to a 
telephone call, letter or e-mail specifically addressed to and directed 
at another person, and that difference . . . is fundamental to the First 
Amendment analysis in this case.”195  Specifically, this distinction 
meant the difference between the presence and absence of an 
important government interest.196  The Fourth Circuit has held, for 
instance, that in the context of a telephone harassment statute, the 
government does have a “strong and legitimate” interest.197  But 
because a Twitter user may disregard the offensive messages, that 
same government interest is not present. 
The second critical aspect of the case was that Zeoli is a 
prominent religious figure.  Amici pointed out that Zeoli’s own 
Twitter account has 17,221 followers, and she has produced 
instructional videos that have been viewed over 143,000 times.198  
Because she is an “easily identifiable public figure that leads a 
religious sect,” the statute implicated types of expression that the 
Supreme Court has consistently attempted to protect.199 
While at first blush the decision in this case casts doubts upon 
the continuing validity of § 2261A(2)(A), Cassidy will not be the last 
word on this cyberstalking statute.  For one, this as-applied holding is 
readily distinguishable, as most stalking cases do not involve 
 
 191  Sengupta, supra note 17.   
 192  Cassidy, 814 F. Supp. 2d at 583. 
 193  Id. at 576. 
 194  Id. at 577. 
 195  Id. at 578. 
 196  Id.  
 197  Id. at 585 (citing Thorne v. Bailey, 846 F.2d 241, 243 (4th Cir. 1988)).   
 198  Cassidy, 814 F. Supp. 2d. at 586 n.14.  Indeed, one can watch her official 
enthronement as Jetsunma Akhon Lhamo, the reincarnation of an important 
Buddhist figure.  ENTHRONEMENT OF JETSUNMA AKHON LHAMO, http://www.tara.org 
/jetsunma-ahkon-lhamo/biography/ (last visited Jan. 2, 2012). 
 199  Cassidy, 814 F. Supp. 2d. at 586. 
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prominent religious figures.  Secondly, and possibly more critically, 
the court’s bulletin board analogy fails to withstand scrutiny.  
Although the court’s description of Twitter was accurate, the court 
glossed over the fact that Zeoli could not actually easily ignore 
Cassidy’s messages.  She did attempt to ignore his tweets, but each 
time she blocked him, Cassidy created a new alias with which to 
harass Zeoli.200  In all, Cassidy employed thirteen different 
usernames.201  Thus, while Cassidy’s speech was not quite as direct as a 
telephone call or e-mail, it is difficult to limit Twitter messages to the 
“public forum” designation, especially given the particular facts of the 
case.  Given the importance of the bulletin board analogy to the 
court’s disposition, it is puzzling that it chose to ignore this seemingly 
critical fact. 
A final shortcoming of § 2261A(2) is its overly cautious reach.  
The statute’s applicability is significantly narrowed by the 
requirement that the offender and the victim be in different states.  
This restriction appears designed to protect against a potential 
Commerce Clause challenge, but it is an unnecessary restriction 
because the use of the Internet alone is enough to satisfy the 
Commerce Clause.202  By including this limitation, Congress 
effectively constrained prosecution to a small subset of potential 
cases.  The limitation, for instance, would preclude prosecution in a 
case like Jebidiah James Stipe’s, if Stipe had been in the same state as 
his victim.  That Stipe’s cyberstalking conduct could go unpunished 
merely by virtue of an invisible and meaningless state line approaches 
the absurd.  Furthermore, in light of the deficiencies in the state 
approach, it becomes clearer still that a proper federal statute must 
have the maximum possible breadth. 
 
 200  Kashmir Hill, You Have a Constitutional Right to Stalk and Harass People on 
Twitter, FORBES, Dec. 16, 2011, available at http://www.forbes.com/sites/kashmirhill 
/2011/12/16/you-have-a-constitutional-right-to-stalk-and-harass-people-on-twitter/.   
 201  Cassidy, 814 F. Supp. 2d  at 579 n.7. 
 202  See U.S. v. MacEwan, 445 F.3d 237 (3d Cir. 2006) (holding that the Internet is 
an instrumentality of interstate commerce, and Congress has the Commerce Clause 
power to regulate the transmission of child pornography even if transmission did not 
cross state lines).  Furthermore, courts’ treatments of the next statute, 18 U.S.C. § 
875, underscore the point.  Section 875 contains no such limiting language, and 
courts have held that threatening Internet communications can be prosecuted even 
where the defendant and the recipient reside in the same state.  See United States v. 
Kammersell, 196 F.3d 1137 (10th Cir. 1999); United States v. Morales, 272 F.3d 284 
(5th Cir. 2001). 
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B.  18 U.S.C. § 875 
This statute, entitled “Interstate Communications,” contains a 
provision that in certain cases applies to cyberstalking.203  Subsection 
(c) prohibits communication containing a threat.204  This provision is 
infrequently applied, and has garnered only a few convictions of 
note.205  The limitation is that the statute requires a “threat.”  The 
usual interpretation of a “true,” or “credible threat,” was expressed in 
United States v. Kelner,206 where the court held that a threat must be an 
“unequivocal, unconditional and specific expression[] of intention 
immediately to inflict injury.”207  This high threshold excludes a broad 
array of cyberstalking activity that does not convey such a narrowly 
construed menace.208 
Unfortunately, at least one court has adopted an even more 
restrictive standard.209  In United States v. Alkhabaz—the case that 
affirmed the dismissal of Jake Baker and Arthur Gonda’s indictments 
under § 875—the Sixth Circuit announced that to amount to a 
“threat,” the communication “must be such that a reasonable person 
(1) would take the statement as a serious expression of an intention 
to inflict bodily harm (the mens rea), and (2) would perceive such 
expression as being communicated to effect some change or achieve 
some goal through intimidation (the actus reus).”210  The dissent in 
Alkhabaz took strong issue with the majority’s extrajudicial addition of 
an element into the statute.211  The judge noted that even though 
 
 203  18 U.S.C. § 875 (2012).  
 204  18 U.S.C. § 875(c). 
 205  One such conviction came in an aforementioned case, United States v. Rose, 
315 F.3d 956, 957 (8th Cir.  2003); see also United States v. Sutcliffe, 505 F.3d 944 (9th 
Cir. 2007) (transmitting interstate threats to injure and transferring social security 
numbers of various targets on website); United States v. Newell, 309 F.3d 396 (6th 
Cir. 2002) (sending “harassing and threatening” e-mails to ex-girlfriend); United 
States v. Scott, 42 F. App’x. 264 (10th Cir. 2002) (sending threatening e-mails); 
Morales, 272 F.3d 284 (entering Internet chat room and threatening to shoot and kill 
students at school); United States v. Johnson, 18 F. App’x 463 (9th Cir. 2000) 
(sending e-mail threats to kill judicial officer); Kammersell, 196 F.3d 1137 (sending a 
bomb threat by instant message). 
 206  534 F.2d 1020 (2d Cir. 1976). 
 207  Id. at 1027. 
 208  For an argument that the “credible threat” standard is outdated, see Joanna 
Lee Mishler, Cyberstalking: Can Communication via the Internet Constitute a Credible 
Threat, and Should an Internet Service Provider be Liable if it Does?, 17 SANTA CLARA 
COMPUTER & HIGH TECH. L.J. 115, 121–29 (2000). 
 209  See United States v. Alkhabaz, 104 F.3d 1492 (6th Cir. 1997).   
 210  Id. at 1495.   
 211  Id. at 1506 (Krupansky, J., dissenting).   
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certain communications under § 875 would satisfy the constitutional 
“threat” standard, they would nonetheless be immune from 
prosecution because, as here, they “were not made with the intent to 
realize a specific purpose through intimidation.”212 
A related problem with § 875 is that its language does not appear 
to allow a “course of conduct” to amount to a threat: the menace 
must be transmitted through one message.213  Given that much of the 
fear generated from cyberstalking is derived from continual contact, 
rather than a single isolated threat, this statute’s applicability is 
limited.  Although § 875 may be useful in certain egregious 
situations, it is not valuable in cyberstalking cases where the fear is 
supplied by the stalker’s continual contact with the victim, rather 
than by the content of the messages themselves. 
C.  47 U.S.C. § 223 
In 2006, Congress amended this longstanding telephone 
harassment statute214—enacted in 1934—”to ensure that e-mail 
messages sent via the Internet were covered by § 223.”215  Today, 
“whoever . . . makes a telephone call or utilizes a telecommunications 
device, whether or not conversation or communication ensues, 
without disclosing his identity and with intent to annoy, abuse, 
threaten, or harass any person” is guilty of sending “obscene or 
harassing” communications.216  While this statute has proven useful in 
the past,217 several issues render it ineffective. 
First, it may be unconstitutional.  The “intent-to-annoy” 
requirement has posed problems in similar statutes.218  In Coates v. City 
of Cincinnati, for example, the Supreme Court struck down an 
ordinance that forbid residents to assemble in groups and comport 
themselves in an “annoying” manner.219  The Court found that the 
statute was unconstitutionally vague because conduct that “annoys 
some people does not annoy others.”220  Therefore, “no standard of 
 
 212  Id. 
 213  18 U.S.C. § 875(c) (2006). 
 214  47 U.S.C. § 223 (2006). 
 215  Goodno, supra note 26, at 148. 
 216  47 U.S.C. § 223(a)(1)(C) (2006). 
 217  It was, for example, used to garner a conviction in United States v. Bowker, 
372 F.3d 365 (6th Cir. 2004), see infra text accompanying notes 225–229. 
 218  See Coates v. City of Cincinnati, 402 U.S. 611 (1971); Bolles v. People, 189 
Colo. 394 (1975). 
 219  402 U.S. at 611. 
 220  Id. at 614.   
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conduct is specified at all.”221  Similarly, in Bolles v. People, the court 
struck down a harassment statute that required the intent to “harass, 
annoy, or alarm”222 on the ground that it was facially overbroad.223  
According to the court, forbidding annoying and alarming 
communications would render illegal discussing “anything that is of 
any significance . . . .  The First Amendment is made of sterner 
stuff.”224 
Only one court has ruled on the constitutionality of the mens 
rea in § 223.225  In the aforementioned case of United States v. Bowker, 
the Sixth Circuit upheld the law.226  In justifying its defense of the 
statute, the court read together the mens rea requirements to give 
them similar meanings.227  So while “annoy” alone may be 
unconstitutionally vague, the court held that when it is associated 
with words like “threaten” and “harass,” its meaning can be easily 
understood.228  The statutes at issue in Coates and Bolles, however, were 
not substantially different than the statute at issue in Bowker.229  Given 
this, and considering that the Bowker court is the only court thus far 
to address the issue in the context of § 223, it would be rash to 
conclude that § 223 passes constitutional muster. 
But even granting the provision constitutional satisfaction does 
not repair its other, and arguably more substantial, infirmities.  
Goodno isolates two important problems.230  First, the fact that the 
statute requires the communicator to be anonymous is problematic.231  
This element, “without reason,” prevents prosecution in cases where 
the victim knows the stalker.232  This problem seems especially weighty 
given that “[m]ore than fifty-nine percent of female stalking victims 
(and thirty percent of male stalking victims) are stalked by an 
intimate partner[.]”233  Second, “the statute applies only to direct 
 
 221  Id.  
 222  189 Colo. at 395 n.1.  
 223  Id. at 399.  
 224  Id. at 398. 
 225  United States v. Bowker, 372 F.3d 365 (6th Cir. 2004). 
 226  Id.  
 227  Id. at 382–83. 
 228  Id.  
 229  Compare 47 U.S.C. § 223 (2006) (“intent to annoy, abuse, threaten, or harass 
any person”), with the statutes at issue in Coates v. City of Cincinnati, 402 U.S. 611, 
612 (1971) (“conduct . . . annoying to persons passing by”) and Bolles, 189 Colo. at 
395 n.1 (“intent to harass, annoy, or alarm another person”). 
 230  Goodno, supra note 26, at 150. 
 231  Id.  
 232  Id.  
 233  Laura Silverstein, The Double Edged Sword: An Examination of the Global 
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communications between the stalker and victim, e.g., the statute 
would only be triggered when the cyberstalker sends an e-mail 
directly to the victim.”234  Therefore, the statute would apply neither 
to Jebidiah James Stipe’s “proxy cyberstalking,”235 nor to William 
Lawrence Cassidy’s indirect Twitter harassment.236  These types of 
conduct are increasingly relevant, and that this statute fails to punish 
them is a major shortcoming. 
In sum, all three federal statutes that are applied to cyberstalking 
have deficiencies that render them ineffectual, both individually and 
in combination.  While the jurisdictional expansiveness of § 875 is 
better than its sharply delimited counterpart in § 2261A(2), § 875’s 
heightened “threat” threshold precludes its application in swaths of 
important cases.  And while § 223’s sprawling mens rea 
requirements—that certainly skirt, if not breach, constitutional 
limits—expand the potential convictions, its other limitations lessen 
its effectiveness, without really broadening the federal government’s 
reach.  What is needed, therefore, is comprehensive federal 
legislation that will incorporate the best parts of existing federal and 
state statutes. 
IV.  PROPOSAL 
Congress has recognized the need for reform in cyberstalking 
legislation.237  Their proposed revisions—specifically with respect to 
§ 2261A—do not, however, go far enough.238  Cyberstalking reform 
must also include amendments that broaden the scope of punishable 
acts, remove jurisdictional impediments, and, in order to ensure 
effective enforcement, provide victims a private cause of action. 
First, Congress should amend § 2261A(1) by removing the 
requirement that the stalker cross state lines, and require only that a 
portion of the cyberstalker’s course of conduct take place online.  
Recall that Wyoming’s stalking statute reflected the increasingly 
 
Positioning System, Enhanced 911, and the Internet and Their Relationships to the Lives of 
Domestic Violence Victims and Their Abusers, 13 BUFF. WOMEN’S L. J. 97, 120 (2006). 
 234  Goodno, supra note 26, at 150. 
 235  Black, supra note 17.  
 236  Sengupta, supra note 17. 
 237  See Stalkers Act of 2011, S. 224, 112th Cong. (2011), available at 
http://thomas.loc.gov/cgi-bin/query/z?c112:S.224.IS:.  
 238  Amended § 2261A(b)(1) would remove the requirement that the stalker and 
victim be in different states where the stalker “uses the mail, any interactive 
computer service, or any other facility of interstate or foreign commerce.”  Id.  By 
suggesting this change, Congress appears to have recognized what this Comment 
earlier suggested: that the use of the Internet itself satisfies the Commerce Clause. 
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common reality that stalkers use the Internet as a tool to facilitate 
traditional, in-person stalking.239  In that sense, cyberstalking can be a 
means, rather than an end.240  Liam Youens did not use the Internet 
as a means of torment, but as a way to collect information about Amy 
Lynn Boyer so that he could be a more effective stalker in the 
physical world.241  When stalkers use the Internet as a virtual 
alternative to monitoring movements in person, the online pursuit 
should be no less culpable than the physical pursuit.  The law must 
recognize that when stalkers use the Internet, they utilize a facility of 
interstate commerce, and, as a result, the requirement that they 
physically cross state lines becomes superfluous.  It limits the number 
of cases that the federal government can pursue, without adding 
value.  When a portion of the stalker’s course of conduct takes place 
online, the law must not also require that the stalker physically cross 
state lines. 
The amended statute must also explicitly recognize that the 
“following” of a victim—language that appears in Wyoming’s law242—
may occur online, and must be included within the prohibited 
“course of conduct.”  The current version of § 2261A(2) prohibits the 
use of “the mail, any interactive computer service, or any facility of 
interstate or foreign commerce to engage in a course of conduct that 
causes substantial emotional distress to that person[.]”243  By its terms, 
online information gathering about a victim would not be 
punishable.  It is difficult, for instance, to assert that a victim will have 
suffered emotional distress from being pursued online when the 
victim is unaware he or she is being pursued.  When the online 
course of conduct extends beyond covert intelligence gathering into 
malicious harassment, then § 2261A(2) clearly kicks in.  But when the 
only online activity goes unnoticed by the victim, § 2261A(2) appears 
not to apply. 
Returning to the Boyer case underscores this point.244  Boyer 
 
 239  Wyoming’s statute defined the punishable course of conduct to include any of 
the following: “(i) [c]ommunicating, anonymously or otherwise, or causing a 
communication with another person by verbal, electronic . . . means in a manner 
that harasses; (ii) [f]ollowing a person . . . ; (iii) [p]lacing a person under 
surveillance . . . ; (iv) [o]therwise engaging in a course of conduct that harasses 
another person.”  WYO. STAT. ANN. § 6-2-506 (1977). 
 240  See Wright, supra note 12. 
 241  Id.  Recall Youens’s own opinion on the matter: “It’s accually [sic] obsene [sic] 
what you can find out about a person on the internet.”  Id. 
 242  WYO. STAT. ANN. § 6-2-506 (1977). 
 243  18 U.S.C. § 2261A(2) (2012) (emphasis added). 
 244  We will ignore, for now, that Youens eventually murdered Boyer.  See Wright, 
supra note 12. 
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never noticed Youens’s Internet activity.245  By its own terms, 
§ 2261A(2) most likely does not apply, because Youens’s online 
course of conduct did not cause his victim substantial emotional 
distress.246  But § 2261A(1) would not apply either, because Youens 
did not cross state lines in his physical pursuit of Boyer.  Amending 
§ 2261A(1) to allow prosecution when the stalker utilizes the 
Internet, but does not cross state lines, as well as explicitly 
recognizing that mere online information gathering is a part of the 
culpable course of conduct, repairs this infirmity. 
Next, Congress should amend § 2261A(2) by removing the 
requirement that the stalker and victim be in different states.  As 
previously noted, United States v. MacEwan held that the Internet is a 
channel and an instrumentality of interstate commerce; therefore, 
the Commerce Clause regulates the transmission of child 
pornography over the Internet even if the transmission does not cross 
state lines.247  In so holding, the court analogized the Internet to 
other traditional instrumentalities of interstate commerce, such as 
bridges, railways, and airplanes.248  Moreover, MacEwan was not an 
isolated holding.  In United States v. Extreme Assocs., the court held that 
the “Internet is a channel of commerce covered by the federal 
statutes regulating the distribution of obscenity.”249 
Therefore, the requirement in § 2261A(2) that the victim be “a 
person in another State” is unnecessary when the Internet is involved.  
Despite Congress’s initial reticence, it seems to have recognized this 
important point of law more recently.  Its proposed amendment to 
§ 2261A states that “[i]t shall be unlawful for any person, with intent 
to kill, physically injure, harass, or intimidate another person, to 
engage in a course of conduct . . . that uses the mail, any interactive 
computer service, or any other facility of interstate or foreign 
commerce[.]”250  This amendment is important for two related 
reasons.  First, it would remove the current requirement that the 
victim and stalker be in different states.251  Second, the language 
used—”that uses the mail, any interactive computer service, or any 
other facility of interstate or foreign commerce”252—suggests that 
 
 245  Id. 
 246  18 U.S.C. § 2261A(2)(B). 
 247  445 F.3d 237 (3d Cir. 2006). 
 248  Id. at 245 n.8.   
 249  431 F.3d 150, 161 (3d Cir. 2005). 
 250  Stalkers Act of 2011, S. 224, 112th Cong. (2011), available at 
http://thomas.loc.gov/cgi-bin/query/z?c112:S.224.IS:. 
 251  18 U.S.C. § 2261A(2)(B). 
 252  Stalkers Act of 2011, S. 224, 112th Cong. (2011) (emphasis added), available at 
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Congress considers an interactive computer service a facility of 
interstate commerce.  Congress should speedily adopt this revision. 
Next, Congress should insert a provision similar to one present 
in Illinois’s law.253  As noted above, the law makes it a crime to 
“create[] and maintain[] an Internet website or webpage which is 
accessible to one or more third parties” that either “communicates a 
threat . . . [or] places that person or a family member of that person 
in reasonable apprehension of immediate or future bodily harm . . . 
or solicits the commission of an act” that would be a violation of 
Illinois’s code.254  This type of language appears to cover two types of 
conduct: “cyberstalking by proxy,” and conduct like that of William 
Lawrence Cassidy, where there is no direct communication between 
the stalker and victim.255 
This Comment’s final suggestion returns again to the Boyer case.  
After her murder, Boyer’s estate brought suit against Docusearch for 
providing Youens with the information that led to her killing.256  
Docusearch argued that it owed no duty to Boyer, and the District 
Court for the District of New Hampshire certified the question to the 
New Hampshire Supreme Court.257  The Supreme Court imposed a 
duty on Docusearch.258  In so concluding, the court began with the 
general rule that “[a]ll persons have a duty to exercise reasonable 
care not to subject others to an unreasonable risk of harm.”259  Duty 
does not arise solely from relationships, the court noted, but also 
“from the need for protection against reasonably foreseeable 
harm.”260  Generally, however, because “actor[s] may reasonably 
proceed upon the assumption that others will obey the law,” criminal 
misconduct is unforeseeable.261  There are three exceptions to this 
general rule: (1) where a special relationship exists; (2) where special 
circumstances exist; and (3) where the duty has been voluntarily 
assumed.262  There are special circumstances “where there is ‘an 
especial temptation and opportunity for criminal misconduct 
 
http://thomas.loc.gov/cgi-bin/query/z?c112:S.224.IS:. 
 253  720 ILL. COMP. STAT. § 5/12-7.5 (2011). 
 254  Id. 
 255  Sengupta, supra note 17. 
 256  Remsburg v. Docusearch, No. CIV. 00-211-B, 2002 WL 844403, at *1 (D.N.H. 
Apr. 25, 2002). 
 257  Id. 
 258  Remsburg v. Docusearch, 816 A.2d 1001, 1006 (N.H. 2003). 
 259  Id. 
 260  Id. (citing Hungerford v. Jones, 722 A.2d 478, 480 (N.H. 1998)).   
 261  Id. (citing Walls v. Oxford Mgmt. Co., 633 A.2d 103, 105 (N.H. 1993)).  
 262  Id. at 1007.  
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brought about by the defendant.’”263  After all, where one creates a 
situation that “involves an unreasonable risk of harm to another,” he 
or she has a duty to prevent that risk from occurring.264 regardless of 
whether the “exact occurrence or precise injuries” were 
foreseeable.265  Critically, the court held that the rise in cyberstalking 
has created just such a foreseeable risk.266  Therefore, the court held, 
if a data broker like Docusearch’s “disclosure of information to a 
client creates a foreseeable risk of criminal misconduct against the 
third person whose information was disclosed, the investigator owes a 
duty to exercise reasonable care not to subject the third person to an 
unreasonable risk of harm.”267 
Congress should follow in the footsteps of the New Hampshire 
Supreme Court and include in § 2261A a private cause of action for 
victims of cyberstalking against data brokers who have breached a 
duty of reasonable care to the people whose information they sell.268  
Incorporating such a remedy would facilitate the government’s goals.  
After all, the provision’s very existence would create a disincentive to 
data brokers to haphazardly provide private individuals’ sensitive 
information to others.  By cutting off the dissemination of this private 
information at its source, the government should be able to 
prevent—rather than punish—cyberstalking. 
V.  CONCLUSION 
When the worlds of crime and technology collide, law 
enforcement is always left fighting to keep up.  Advances arrive at a 
head-spinning rate, and criminals tend to be quick learners.  Despite 
the government’s best intentions, it has not been able to keep pace 
with technological “advancements” in cyberstalking.  New ways to 
distribute and collect information have supplanted older and 
established means, allowing cyberstalkers to skirt the edges of 
established law.  By necessity, the states and Congress have attacked 
the problem in piecemeal fashion, addressing specific problems when 
they arise.  While these stopgap measures were no doubt justified 
when they were first contemplated, the resulting collection of 
 
 263  Id. (citing Walls, 663 A.3d at 106).   
 264  Remsburg, 816 A.2d at 1007. 
 265  Id. (citing Iannelli v. Burger King Corp., 761 A.2d 417, 420 (2000)).   
 266  Id. at 1008. 
 267  Id. at 1007.  
 268  For a discussion on the applicability of the tort of intrusion in this context, see 
William Dalsen, Comment, Civil Remedies for Invasions of Privacy: A Perspective on 
Software Vendors and Intrusion upon Seclusion, 2009 WIS. L. REV. 1059 (2009). 
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divergent approaches created a muddled system of overlapping 
obligations.  Simplifying the federal government’s approach while 
broadening its reach will eliminate confusion and allow the federal 
government to pursue a wide range of dangerous criminals.  
Adopting these proposed revisions and excising the state approach 
should correct some of the current ills, and protect some currently 
vulnerable victims. 
